Examining the Factors Behind the United Nations' Failure in Somalia
TITLE
Analyse the reasons why the United Nations failed in Somalia.
ESSAY
Title: The Failure of United Nations Interventions in Somalia
Introduction
The United Nations' efforts to stabilize and provide humanitarian aid in Somalia during the early 1990s were marred by a series of failures that ultimately led to the collapse of their missions. The volatile political landscape, lack of cooperation from local warlords, inadequate international response, and bureaucratic inefficiencies all played a role in the UN's inability to bring about peace and stability in Somalia. This essay will analyze the reasons behind the failure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) and subsequent missions, highlighting the challenges faced and the shortcomings of the UN's interventions.
Political Turmoil and Clan Warfare
Following the fall of President Siyad Barre in January 1991 and the ensuing power vacuum, Somalia descended into a state of civil war characterized by factional power struggles among various clans and warlords. The lack of a central government and the absence of a cohesive state structure made it difficult for the United Nations to obtain consent to deploy troops and enforce its mandates effectively. The rivalry between factions supporting different leaders further complicated the situation and hindered efforts to establish peace and stability.
Limited Mandate and Security Concerns
The collapse of the Somali central government meant that the UN's mandate was limited, and their ability to operate beyond Mogadishu was severely constrained. Local warlords and armed gangs prevented the distribution of aid by engaging in looting and attacks on humanitarian convoys. The lack of security and lawlessness in the country posed significant challenges for UN peacekeeping troops, undermining their effectiveness and impeding their ability to carry out their mission successfully.
Inadequate International Response
Despite multiple Security Council resolutions and calls for humanitarian intervention, the international response to Somalia's crisis was inadequate. Delays in implementing relief programs, disagreements between UN agencies and humanitarian workers, and bureaucratic inefficiencies further hindered the delivery of aid to those in need. The reluctance of some countries to commit resources to the mission also contributed to the failures of UNOSOM I.
Bureaucratic Inefficiencies and Lack of Coordination
The UN's failure to coordinate effectively with local actors, humanitarian organizations, and other stakeholders in Somalia hampered the success of its interventions. Troops often disregarded orders from UN commanders, leading to delays and confusion in carrying out operations. The lack of a coherent strategy that aligned military, political, economic, and social objectives also undermined the UN's efforts to stabilize the country and address the root causes of the conflict.
Conclusion
The United Nations' interventions in Somalia during the early 1990s were marked by a series of failures resulting from a combination of political instability, security challenges, inadequate international response, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Despite the establishment of subsequent missions such as UNITAF and UNOSOM II, the underlying structural issues and lack of coordination continued to pose significant obstacles to achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia. This case serves as a valuable lesson for future peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, highlighting the importance of addressing root causes, collaborating with local actors, and ensuring effective coordination among all stakeholders involved in such missions.
SUBJECT
HISTORY
PAPER
A LEVEL
NOTES
Analyse the reasons why the United Nations failed in Somalia.
President Siyad Barre fell from power in January 1991; he had ruled through his own support network and played off clans against each other causing factional power struggles. The economy of the country began to decline and by 1988 violent opposition to his rule had turned into a civil war.
In November 1991, there was intense fighting in Mogadishu between the factions, one supporting Interim President, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, Mohamed Farah Aidid. In March 1992 a ceasefire had been agreed but it was ignored by the fighters on both sides.
The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 751 of 24 April 1992. UNOSOM 1 was dispatched to monitor the cease-fire and to protect the personnel involved in the humanitarian work. The collapse of the Somali central government meant that the UN was unable to obtain consent to deploy troops and as a result their mandate was limited; local warlords prevented them from moving much beyond the airport in Mogadishu. Lawlessness and lack of security prevented aid from being distributed. There was looting of supplies by armed gangs and attacks on ships and on airports.
However, blame for the failure of UNISOM 1 can also be attributed to the UN itself. Troops often refused to accept orders from UN commanders before checking with their own governments causing delays; the international response to Somalia's problems was also inadequate. Although three separate Security Council resolutions were passed in the first half of 1992, UN humanitarian agencies failed to implement the relief program. It was also reported in ‘The New York Times’ in December 1991 that the United States held back UN efforts with the State Department because of safety concerns over the peacekeeping force. It was not until January 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali became UN Secretary-General that the UN became more heavily involved with humanitarian aid. Public pressure was put on governments internationally as the media drew attention to the catastrophe and the effects of widespread famine. There were also arguments between the UN and other humanitarian workers in Somalia and the UN reported that the failure of relief operations was due to the bureaucracy involved.
Resolution 751 called for the establishment of a peacekeeping force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu which included the deployment of 50 unarmed military observers to monitor the ceasefire agreement in the city and agreed in principle to the idea of a UN force to escort the delivery of humanitarian aid. By late October 1992, it was clear that the new plan was not working as intended; the small UN peacekeeping contingent could not ensure that humanitarian aid was delivered throughout the country.
Following the ineffective UNOSOM I mission, Boutros-Ghali launched the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992. This was an American-led force of 30,000 troops from 23 countries authorized by Security Council Resolution to provide security for relief operations. The widespread famine and continued civil war in Somalia were seen as a threat to international peace and provided the reason for allowing the forces. The UNITAF forces were largely successful in supplying humanitarian aid but in March 1993 they handed over to UNOSOM II This put military and security objectives before political, economic, and social ones and turned into a peace enforcement mission.