Soviet Foreign Policy Goals (1924-1941): An Analysis
TITLE
Assess the aims of Soviet Foreign Policy in the period 1924–41.
ESSAY
Soviet foreign policy in the period of 1924-1941 was shaped by a complex interplay of ideological goals and pragmatic necessities. The tension between the promotion of world revolution and the need for security from external threats, particularly the looming specter of a rearming Germany, influenced the direction of Soviet foreign policy during this time.
At the outset, following the tumultuous aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the civil war, the new Soviet state under Lenin and later Stalin sought to consolidate its power and focus on building socialism within its borders. The idea of "socialism in one country" was a pragmatic approach that acknowledged the limitations of the young Soviet Union in terms of military resources and the failures of revolutionary movements in other countries.
This realism was evident in Soviet efforts to establish diplomatic relations with other European powers, such as the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany and trade agreements with Britain. The Soviet leadership understood the importance of securing economic ties and international recognition to develop industry and strengthen the proletariat at home.
However, the rise of right-wing dictators in Europe, such as Hitler in Germany, presented a new set of challenges for Soviet foreign policy. The need for security against a potentially hostile and rapidly rearming Germany became a top priority. This led to a strategic shift and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, which aimed to overturn the isolation imposed by the Versailles system and regain lost territory as a defensive buffer against German expansionism.
While the goal of promoting world revolution and ideological change remained a core aspect of Soviet foreign policy in theory, the practical realities of the international situation often forced the Soviet leadership to make strategic compromises. For example, the Popular Front strategy in France and the support for leftist groups in Spain did not yield the desired results and, in some cases, backfired by fueling anti-Soviet propaganda.
The shifting aims of Soviet foreign policy during this period can be seen as a response to the changing geopolitical landscape and the imperative of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of the USSR. The pragmatic considerations of realpolitik often took precedence over ideological purity, as evidenced by the willingness to collaborate with former enemies like Nazi Germany for strategic reasons.
In conclusion, the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the period 1924-1941 were a complex blend of ideological goals, security imperatives, and strategic calculations. The trajectory of Soviet diplomacy during this time reflects the challenges of navigating a hostile international environment while balancing the need for both ideological expansion and national security.
SUBJECT
HISTORY
PAPER
A LEVEL
NOTES
Assess the aims of Soviet Foreign Policy in the period 1924–41.
The tension in Soviet policy was between the promotion of world revolution and the undermining of capitalism and the practical needs of the USSR for security from invasion and outside intervention while creating a socialist economy and society. Stalin’s policy of socialism in one country was based on a realistic estimate of the state of the USSR’s military resources and the failures of revolutionary movements after the First World War, together with the need to create enough industry to develop the proletariat in whose name the Bolsheviks had taken power.
Thus, it was important to establish what links were possible with other European powers through arrangements like those established with Germany in the Treaty of Rapallo and with trade agreements such as made with Britain in 1924. Also, this meant establishing relations even with regimes hostile to Communism such as Nationalist China and not giving much support to destabilising revolutionary groups despite the ideological opposition. The rise of the right-wing dictators changed the situation and made isolation dangerous, but the promotion of united fronts with left-wing groups in Europe promoted by Litvinov was problematic in terms of results. Intervention in Spain caused unrest and fed into the Fascist propaganda machine of a Soviet threat. In France the Popular Front did not secure a very strong alliance in 1935, but this was enough to intensify isolation and Soviet foreign policy changed course with the appointment of Molotov.
The primary aim was to increase security against a rapidly rearming Germany with stated aims of colonizing Russian territory. Better relations with the democracies proved impossible so a volte face in terms of the Nazi-Soviet pact was made. This led to the fulfillment of an aim to overturn the isolation established by the cordon sanitaire of Versailles and to regain lost territory which would act as an effective defensive buffer in the form of Eastern Poland and the Baltic States. So, a clear aim was to regain the land and power lost as a result of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the hostility of the victors of World War I to the new Soviet state.
The aim of establishing Soviet domination of the leftist political parties through a Popular Front had not proved so successful. The aim of bringing about worldwide ideological change remained more a pious hope than a guide to actual policy, pursued by covert underground activities rather than a clear and open foreign policy and specifically rejected in 1939 when exiled German communists were handed over to Hitler and a pact linking the Communist state to its most bitter ideological foe for reasons of realpolitik was adopted. It could be argued that aims changed, or it could be argued that security against western attack after the trauma of allied intervention and the overturning of the Paris settlement remained constant.